An arrest in a Tuscan port is rarely international news.

But the decision of the Italian police to seize Scheherazade Friday is different at Marina de Carrara.

For one thing, Scheherazade is not a man, but a 140-meter luxury superyacht.

And on the other hand, American officials say that its real owner, through a cloud of intermediaries, is probably the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin.

The hijacking by police of large yachts in European ports has become the most visible symbol of the West’s efforts to suppress Putin and his inner circle in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

But they are also particularly visible evidence of Corruption of the ruling class of Russia.

Scheherazade has gold-plated bathroom fixtures, helicopter landing pads, and a dance floor that turns into a pool, the latter raising the unexpected question of whether Putin is a fan of the classic film “It’s a Wonderful Life.” “.

All of this, needless to say, is beyond the reach of the government’s salary.

So the dazzling ship is a useful concrete reminder of what Russian experts have been saying for years:

that it is impossible to understand the Putin regime without understanding the corruption that, in turn, created, fed, molded and limited.

And that may, one day, prove to be his devastation.

Mapping out the details of that corruption will be a lifelong task.

But two simple ideas will help you understand the big picture.

The first is true for systematic corruption wherever this happens:

it is not primarily a problem of individual immorality, but a trap of collective action.

And the second is true for Russia:

caught in that trap as a result of his wrong move and ultimately incompletein democracy in the 1990s.

A problem with collective action

We often think of corruption as a moral failure, when a greedy person decides to make a profit by directing public resources towards private gain.

But while that’s not exactly wrong, it misses the most important point:

that is, corruption is a group activity.

You need briber and briber, diverters of resources and touts of resources, look the other way and ask for a share from the takers.

When this type of corrupt behavior online becomes prevalent, it creates it own parallel system of rewards and punishments.

“The difference with systemic corruption is that it is the expected behaviorsays Anna Persson, a political scientist at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, who studies corruption.

“These expectations are very difficult for everyone to actually oppose corruption, because it is very costly in all the different ways to fight that kind of system.”

Those who refuse to participate in the same economy of favors and bribes are passed on for promotion, denied benefits, and lose power.

Meanwhile, those accustomed to corruption rise in ranks, gain more authority, more resources to distribute to their cronies, and more ability to punish anyone who threatens them.

The result is a system in which power and wealth are accumulated in those who want to play corruption, and in those who do not. they stay behind.

Corruption “serves as a regressive tax, it’s like Robin Hood in reverse,” Persson said.

“All resources are transferred to the top of the system, at great cost for the majority of the population.”

The most obvious evidence of such corrupt dynamics in Russia can be found in luxury estates and mega-yachts owned by high-ranking officials and their closest associates.

But the damage deepens, extending into the lives of ordinary people and depriving them not only of government services and goods diverted into private pockets, but also, often, of their fundamental rights.

Ivan Golunov, one of the well-known journalists in the Russian investigation, has spent many years solidly reporting on corruption in the Moscow city government, revealing evidence of friendly deals, lost money and failed service to public.

In 2019, he was arrested for wrongful drug case, beaten and imprisoned.

After an unprecedented outcry in the Russian and foreign media, he was released and the cases dropped.

But the message is obvious: those who try to destroy the culture of corruption risk losing their safety, freedom, or even their lives.

Some democracy, but not enough

But why has corruption in Russia worsened so much?

The answer, and perhaps counterintuitive, is in democratization.

Or rather, not enough, says Kelly McMann, a political scientist at Case Western Reserve University who studies corruption and one of the directors of V-Dem, a long-standing study of the nature and power of democracy throughout world. .

There was corruption in the Soviet Union.

But after its dissolution in 1991, the sudden explosion of freedom of expression and freedom of association in Russia and other countries and satellites of the former Soviet Union brought new opportunities, not only for political and economic development, but for those crime and corruption.

“Freedoms of expression and association not only have to be used for good things, they can also be used for illegal activities,” McMann said.

“When people are easier to meet and communicate, they are allowed to plan corrupt activities.”

That wouldn’t be so bad if democratization also resulted in scrutiny in the executive branch, an independent judiciary to investigate and prosecute crimes.

“For capitalism to have a working market, it must also build institutions.

You need banks that can provide credit, you need a strong legal system that protects property, ”McMann said.

Estonia followed that path.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Estonia’s newly elected parliament strengthened the judiciary and initiated new reviews of the executive branch.

That’s where corruption falls.

But in Russiathe government listened to the insistence of Western advisers to remove the state from the economy as much as possible to allow free markets to flourish.

Institutions and limits fell by the wayside.

In that vacuum, a uniform structure of corruption developed, driving honest politicians out of government and honest businesses out of the market.

In the late 1990s, official corruption flourished at all levels of government.

In 1999, when the president’s presidency Boris Yeltsin began to weaken, the elites forced him to leave office on their terms.

If Yeltsin anoints his chosen successor, they will ensure that he and his family are not prosecuted for embezzling government funds.

He accepted.

In August 1999, Yeltsin presented that alternative:

a young former KGB agent from St. Petersburg named Vladimir Putin.

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