Exchange rate pressure, monetary and fiscal turmoil, and ultimately instability and uncertainty are a classic in governments crossed by endless power struggles, similar to misrule and with no other plan than kicking the ball forward. It is sung, therefore, that much can hardly come out of such a group.

No guessing: that picture was the one that Sergio Massa received and proposed to shoot six months ago, when he took over the Ministry of Economy with the management of the entire decision-making panel in his hands, with presidential ambitions and an aura of savior from the outset exaggerated.

To begin with, you are in trouble with the priority of priorities that was imposed on you at the beginning of your new official adventure, i.e., keep financial or parallel dollars at bay and, in the same act, compress the gap between them and the official exchange rate.

He has a couple of precedents in his favor that he has proposed to exploit: the 120% exchange rate gap left by Martín Guzmán in early July and the nearly 160% by Silvia Batakis in late July. But all of Massa’s progress so far has been about pushing the gap towards the 100% zone or, more accurately, towards around 108%, which is to say no big deal at the moment.

Specialists argue that the reasonable limit is 30%. and that from there we advance towards decidedly excessive profits. Or if you want, normal ones here, like those managed by those who can access the official dollar of 185 dollars and, somehow, exchange it around the 367 dollars that some parallel companies use are quoted.

The problem with gaps of this size is that the official exchange rate sounds too backward and, often, it does smell of devaluation and that there are those who act accordingly. Nothing unusual in this world our super trained in the art of betting on the dollar.

Mass essayed entrance a bold moveif not directly rash, to deflate the ball, recover some of the trust in Argentina that has been up for grabs for years and thus create the conditions to lower country risk and reopen the doors of international credit.

As someone trying to attest to a good payer, the deal board was successful buy foreign debt bonds cheapwith state reserves and an initial fee set at US$1,000 million.

Sounds or sounded good for the deleveraging militancyonly that it ran the risk of spending, or squandering, scarce foreign currency on deals that would not necessarily really change the external landscape.

For the moment, no reopening of external financing has emerged, but a loss of revenge calculated at 350 million dollars and experienced or knowledgeable operators who, with the bonus game, made a quick 28% profit in just a couple of hops.

However, the setback does not seem to have affected phase two of the move: close the US$ 2,000-2,400 million loan that Massa had entered into negotiations with a group of foreign banks even before taking office. With a payment term of six months, renewable for another six, the credit would in fact function as a guarantee for the repurchase of the debt. In other words, oxygen when it’s needed most.

Behind the goal of lowering country risk was the idea of ​​reducing the financial cost of the loan itself and crowning the move. But since country risk remains where it was or a few points higher, the interest rate on the operation remains around a not cheap 15% per annum in dollars.

Another central protagonist of the film is the old blue dollar, who, stimulated by the incredible power struggles within the government, by the economic crisis and by mistrust, is in his element.

From record to record, it traded at $386, up 11.6% in January, which nearly doubled the 5-6% inflation forecast for the month and lengthened the gap with the official exchange rate to 108 %. He’s the king of the market again.

The fact is that in the meantime blue has returned to being one of the usual parameters adjust prices and above all a parameter that delays, which is to say that it has plenty of room to grow ahead. Yellow light for the recently released Fair Prices plan and the aspiration to start the indices of some months with a 3 instead of 4.

It is not that the parallel immediately recovers, not even progressively, the lost ground. But we are talking about a currency whose price rose 68% last year, a full 27 percentage points below inflation, a currency which has always been a refuge from devaluation of the peso and which in this world around it also seems cheap . .

Obviously: between what he puts his mind to and what he has achieved with his own means, that is, between a lot and a little, the Minister of the Economy isn’t having a good time.

There comes nothing less than the loss of reserves or, if you prefer, difficulties with holding the coins coming in. It is a serious problem in an economy that works very tied to dollars that does not generate in the magnitude of its needs and even more serious if the prospect does not look like an improvement.

It happened that with calls soy dollars the government managed to raise a package of 3.2 billion dollars more, at the cost of depositing a large and controversial exchange rate differential in favor of producers and exporters, ie a devaluation à la carte. And in the end it happened that of the 3,200 million dollars raised, little or nothing remained in the coffers of the Central Bank.

Another instance of the same or a similar species also occurred last year. With soybeans leading the way, exports of the oilseeds-grains complex totaled $40.438 million, an all-time high.

And how much of that mountain of dollars was left in BCRA’s reserves? According to the most recent private estimates, about 5.6 billion dollars are left net, that is less than a month of imports or much less if we refer to the 7.8 billion dollars in August before the sickle that hit them l ‘Economy.

Already scratching the bottom of the pot, Soy 3 will arrive around March. Another advantage resulting from inexperience and a hasty slap due to scarce reserves will be received by those who still keep production in the field even if it doesn’t turn out to be a big problem.

A glance consists in continuing to tighten the grip that blocks imports, after months of record purchases abroad and a policy that at its discretion opens up wide margins of suspicion. In any case, the effect there is called a cooling of the economy, only a few businesses reverse and have begun to stagnate.

Evident, again: nothing that is in sight facilitates the Mass Arrival Plan, even if it is a question of arriving with a pure patch. Less when there are still nine tough months left before the elections and more when instead of managing the government to which it belongs with a certain efficiency, it behaves like a mortar.

The political ambitions that led him to become a key minister, with powers enviable for others, command to continue, just like his self-esteem and probably some commitments made with fellow travelers. Of course, in any or all of the hypotheses, reality dictates that Sergio Massa will soon show results that support his aspirations as president.