When people in northern Nova Scotia began killing a man disguised as a constable two years ago, there was great confusion as to who was responsible for the operation. RCMP
according to recently released documents.Public inquiry into the tragedy also heard about communication disturbance which took place on April 18-19, 2020, when 22 people were killed in the worst shooting in modern Canadian history.
In a summary of the evidence on the command’s decisions RCMPJamie Blaira resident of rural Portapique, Nova Scotia, called 911 to report that her husband had just been shot by a man with a big gun.
published on Tuesday, reminded the investigation that the first indication of unrest came at 10:01 pm, April 18, 2020. PreviouslyWhen the shooter entered her home, Ms. Blair reported just before the shooting that the attacker had a police car, but not a police officer.
At that time, Staff Sergeant Brian Rehill is the risk manager of RCMP at its operational communications center in Truro, Nova Scotia. In accordance with the protocol of RCMPhe immediately took the command.
Over the next 30 minutes, when reports of more deadly shootings emerged, Staff Sgt. Rehill initiated the critical incident command structure of RCMP and enlisted the help of four other sergeant personnel: Steve Halliday, Addie MacCallum, Al Carroll at Jeff West.
The 130-page document includes excerpts from an interview with Sergeant Hallidaywho clarified that he believed he was responsible the general operation when he arrives at the detachment of RCMP sa Bible Hillin Nova Scotia, at exactly 11:30 p.m.
But. Halliday An investigator was told he decided to let Mr. Rehill resource control as ad hoc incident commander.
I decided to leave Brian in this rolehe told an investigator.
Meanwhile, Al CarrollColchester County district commander, told officers Mr. Rehill was on command until 11:45 p.m.
In an interview with the commission last year, Mr. Rehill he said he understood who he would be initial commander of the critical incident to a trained commander, Jeff Westcoming later in the evening.
Another official of RCMPAndy O’Brien, Detachment Operations NCO Bible Hill. Although he was off duty and drank four alcoholic beverages, Mr. O’Brien took his portable radio from the detachment, with the help of his wife, and also gave directions to investigators.
also gives instructions that night: SergeantThe question of who was responsible for those crucial first hours was discussed in an earlier occupational health and safety report, which found that RCMP
violated the federal Labor Code by not ensuring that employees have the necessary supervision.In a report on March 29, the investigator Lorna Macmillan stated that General Duty staff worked on a environment of confusion as to who has command and control over the situation.
Mrs. MacMillan the training of supervisors has been decided did not provide the skills necessary to [leur] enable the management of an ongoing critical incident, such as an active shooter in a large, rural, outdoor environment.
The agents are alone in the field
Tim MillsCorporal of RCMP head of the Tactical Response Unit at the time, testified Monday that he and his 12-member team were given limited instructions as they attempted to detect the kill on the second day.
Roger Burrill, lead investigating counsel, Mr. asked. mills : As you respond and the attacker moves, does anyone point to your response locations?
No nocorporal response millswho has retired from force.
As for the concerned experienced agents, superintendents are mentioned in the final document Darren Campbell at Chris Leather. But few details were given, other than the confirmation that Mr. Campbell approved the deployment of a critical incident commander at 10:46 pm, before sending an email stating that there was some gunshot. The document says it remains unclear who received the email.
At exactly 11:08 pm, Mr. Skin Mr. texted. Campbell indicating that he knew a double homicide and active shooter north of Truro. Lord. Campbell responded by confirming that he had approved a critical incident commander, but no further details would be offered.
wireless line
At 1:19 am on April 19, 2020, Staff Sgt. Jeff West take over as critical incident commander in a command post at Great Village, Nova Scotia, about 10 kilometers east of Portapique. But due to heavy traffic on the radios RCMP he was unable to announce the change until five minutes later.
The inquest heard that police two-way radio communication had been a mess for most of the initial investigation, especially since the system could not cope with the number of incoming calls. Trent Milton, said a member of the emergency response team who testified Monday communication disturbance.
Asked by Robert Pineoan attorney representing the families of the 14 victims, the RCMP official said: So many people are trying to get into the radio, and it’s confusing.
And when Staff Sergeant Dan MacGillivray took over as Critical Incident Commander at 10:20 am on April 19, 2020, he was unable to broadcast the change of command until 11:21 am, again due to blocked airwaves.
The investigation found that the shooter, Gabriel WortmanSi, a 51-year-old dental technician, was shot by two officers just before 11:30 a.m. when he stopped at a gas station north of Halifax to refuel a stolen car.
Source: Radio-Canada