Putin’s energy offensive has failed

Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

Since then, Russia has launched four major offensives.

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Three were military; the fourth was cheap.

And while you don’t hear much about this latest offensive, it is failure offers some very important lessons.

Everyone knows the first military offensive:

the blitzkrieg attempt that was supposed to conquer Kiev and other major Ukrainian cities in a matter of days.

Many observers – particularly, but not limited to, the Western right who fetishized the perceived prowess of the unawakened Russian military – expected this blitzkrieg to be successful.

Instead it became a epic defeat:

Crippled by a stubborn Ukrainian defense, the Russians eventually retreated after suffering massive casualties.

The second offensive was more limited in scope:

a spring attack in eastern Ukraine.

Again many observers expected a decisive Russian victory, perhaps the encirclement of a large part of the Ukrainian army.

And the Russians have made some gains thanks to their overwhelming artillery superiority.

But this offensive stalled once Ukraine acquired Western precision weapons, especially the now famous ones HIMARS, which wreaked havoc in the Russian rear.

Finally, Ukraine was able launch counterattacks which allowed him to recover considerable land, especially the city of Cherson.

The Third Russian Offensive,

a winter attack in the region of Donbass,

continues, and Ukraine could decide to withdraw from the besieged city of Bakhmut, a place of little strategic importance but which has become the scene of incredibly bloody fighting.

But most observers I’ve read see the company as a whole as a whole new strategic failure.

In some ways, however, Russia’s most significant defeat came not on the battlefield, but on the economic front.

I said that Russia has launched four major offensives;

the fourth was the attempt to blackmail the European democracies abandon their support for Ukraine by cutting off the supply of natural gas.

There were reasons for concern about this attempt to arm the feeder.

Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine initially disrupted the markets for several commodities – Russia is a major oil producer, and both Russia and Ukraine were major agricultural exporters before the war – the Natural gas seemed like a particularly severe pressure point.

Why?

Because it’s not really traded in a world market.

The cheapest way to transport it is via pipelines, and it was unclear how Europe could replace Russian gas if supplies were cut off.

Many people, myself included, were concerned about the effects of a de facto embargo on Russian gas.

Would it cause a European recession?

Would troubled times in Europe undermine the will to continue helping Ukraine?

Well, the big story – a story that hasn’t gotten much media attention, because it’s hard to tell about things that didn’t happen – is that Europe he resisted the loss of Russian supplies remarkably well.

Unemployment in the euro area has not increased at all; inflation has soared, but European governments have succeeded, through a combination of price controls and financial aid, in limiting (though not eliminating) the personal hardships created by high gas prices.

And Europe has managed to carry on despite the cut off of most of Russia’s gas.

This is partly due to reliance on other gas sources, such as liquefied natural gas from the United States, and partly due to conservation efforts that have reduced demand for it.

In part it reflects a temporary return to coal-fired electricity generation; largely reflects the fact that Europe already receives much of its energy from renewable energy.

And yes, it was an unusually warm winter, which also helped.

But the bottom line, as a report from the European Council on Foreign Relations puts it, is that “Moscow has failed in its attempt to blackmail EU member states by denying gas.”

Indeed, Europe has increased its military aid to Ukraine, mainly by sending main battle tanks that can contribute to the upcoming Ukrainian counter-offensive.

What can we learn from the failure of the Russian energy offensive?

First of all, Russia looks better than ever to superpower potemkinwith little behind its imposing facade.

His vaunted army is far less effective than advertised; now its role as an energy supplier is proving much more difficult to militarize than many imagined.

Secondly, democracies are proving, as they have done many times before, that they are a lot tougher and harder to intimidate what do they look like

Finally, modern economies are far more flexible, far more capable of coping with change, than some vested interests would have us believe.

For as long as I can remember, fossil fuel lobbyists and their political backers have insisted that any attempt to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would be disastrous for jobs and economic growth.

But what we are seeing now is that Europe is doing a energy transition under the worst possible circumstances – sudden, unexpected and drastic – and handling them quite well.

This suggests that a gradual and planned transition to green energy would be much easier than pessimists imagine.

c.2023 The New York Times Society