How the Russian offensive stalled

After months of sending troops into eastern Ukraine, Russia’s progress boils down to this:

three small settlements and part of the city of Bakhmut, a high-profile battlefield with a limited strategic value.

Compare what Moscow hoped to achieve by now with its winter offensive:

take the entire Donbass regionwhich contains dozens of other settlements, some of them much larger than Bakhmut.

To do this, Russia would have to recreate and win battles on the scale of Bakhmut again and again.

Russia’s advance looks increasingly unlikely.

Regardless of the outcome of the fierce battle for Bakhmut, Moscow’s inability to gain ground in the Donbass proves how little he got its offensive and how hard its army fought to capture urban areas effectively during the war.

Having mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops, Russia is no longer severely understaffed, as it was in the fall, when it lost large swathes of the northeast to a surprise Ukrainian counter-offensive.

But even with more troops and firepower, Russia managed, at best, to make only some headway, running into well-prepared Ukrainian positions, protected by cellars and buildings, with heavily fortified defensive lines after nearly a decade of fighting. . .

the Ukrainians they fought against the separatists supported by Russia in the Donbas region for years before the full invasion in February last year.

This year, a Russian attack near the mining town of Vuhledar ended in defeat after Ukrainian soldiers ambushed poorly organized tank columns.

An attempt to capture the city of Avdiivka it hasn’t thrived in recent weeks, even if the Russian bombing seems to be continuing.

And a tenacious Ukrainian defense has withstood wave after wave of Russian attacks aimed at encircling Bakhmut, home to some 70,000 people.

The losses on both sides have been enormous, but the ground changing hands is tiny.

Russia has struggled to gain ground as it had barely stabilized after losses it suffered in the autumn before launching its winter offensive, it said last month. Michael Koffmanndirector of Russia studies at CNA, a Virginia research institute, at the podcast “War on the Rocks”.

“The Russian military lacks the quality of strength,” Kofman said.

“Nor does it seem to necessarily have the necessary ammunition. And he can’t replace junior managers in such a short time.”

The revolutionary Russian advances in Bakhmut were led by a private military company Wagnerwhich has recruited tens of thousands of prisoners from Russian prisons in exchange for the promise of freedom.

The long and bloody fight for Bakhmut depleted Wagner’s supply of prisoner recruits, according to Ukrainian officials, forcing her to use more of her professional recruits.

Military analysts are skeptical that Russia could repeat its strategy of raiding near-suicidal prisoners it used in Bakhmut in future Ukrainian cities.

The battles also took a significant toll on Ukraine.

The Ukrainian military is about to launch a major counter-offensive this spring and, in continuing to try to hold down Bakhmut, has lost dozens of battle-hardened soldiers who could have been used in his offensive.

To the south, Kiev will face Russia’s well-prepared network of trenches, tank traps and minefields.

Ukrainian forces will also have to contend with persistent shortages of ammunition.

Western officials have expressed concern about how quickly Ukraine is depleting its artillery reserves, firing thousands of shells a day as it defends Bakhmut at all costs.

Western producers are ramping up production, but it will be several months before new supplies start to meet demand.

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