Russia catches Ukraine off guard with small suicide drone ‘loitering munitions’

Russia’s new model ‘Lancet’ flies at a high speed of 300 km/h at low altitude, making interception difficult

Ukrainian military authorities received a shocking report on September 19th. Several Russian military drones flew into the Ukrainian military’s temporary airfield 65 km from the front line. Russian military drones have been attacking various inland Ukrainian cities this year, but this airstrike is a particularly noteworthy example. The Russian military has been operating the Shahed-136, a long-range attack drone, and on September 19th, it carried out its first deep strike with a loitering munition (aka suicide drone), a close-range tactical strike drone.

Russia imported large quantities of Shahed-136 drones from Iran and is now producing them itself. Shahed-136 is a relatively large suicide drone with a length of 3.5 m, a wingspan of 2.5 m, and a take-off weight of 200 kg. It is said to be inexpensive because it uses a motorcycle engine, and the fuselage is light and has a large fuel capacity, so it can easily fly 2,000 km. Russia is known to have acquired at least 1,000 Shahed-136s from Iran. Currently, it is domestically produced under the name ‘Geran-2’ and is being steadily deployed to attack Ukraine at a rate of 20 to 30 units per day.

For the Ukrainian military, Shahed-136 is a very threatening weapon. This is because the flight altitude is relatively low and the volume is smaller than that of an ordinary manned aircraft, making it difficult to detect with ground radar. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) early warning aircraft, which patrols around Eastern Europe, are supporting Ukrainian military air defense operations, but do not have a real-time data link with front-line troops. Therefore, it is impossible to predict the entry course even if Shahed-136 changes its path slightly during flight. This is a very difficult drone for the Ukrainian military to respond to.

The problem is that small suicide drones, which are more difficult to respond to than the Shahed-136, have begun to be used for deep strikes. This is the ‘Lancet’ loitering ammunition developed independently by Russia. As the name suggests, loitering ammunition is a weapon that flies over the operational area, spins around as if wandering in the air, then rushes to the target and self-destructs. Because of these characteristics, it is also called a suicide drone. Lancet was developed by a subsidiary of the Kalashnikov Group, a Russian weapons company famous for its AK rifles, and was first released in 2019. Although it did not receive much attention immediately after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it came to prominence in June of this year as the Ukrainian military’s counteroffensive began in earnest. As Russian artillery losses rapidly increased due to the Ukrainian army’s massive offensive, drones began to supplement the lack of firepower.

An apartment building in Kiev, Ukraine, destroyed by a Russian military suicide drone attack. [뉴시스]

The lancet is only 1.6m long, 1m wingspan, and 12kg take-off weight. While the Shahed-136’s warhead weighs 50 kg, the lancet weighs only 5 kg, so its destructive power is weak. The flight distance is only 25 to 40 km. Because of these meager specifications, the Lancet was the subject of ridicule by the Ukrainian military until this summer. Because the lancet’s warhead was poorly designed, there were many cases where tanks and self-propelled guns that were directly hit by this drone suffered no significant damage. The overall performance was poor, with the Ukrainian military disabling the lancet with a fishing net. Then, Russia created an improved lancet that improved these problems. Russia converted a large store of a famous Swedish furniture company that withdrew from the country into a drone factory, increasing drone production in July by 50 times compared to the previous month.

There are two types of improved lancet models: ‘Lancet-3’ and ‘Izdeliye-53’. The size is the same as before, but the warhead weight has been slightly increased, and the autonomous flight navigation system, electro-optical guidance system, and data communication system have been strengthened. A function has also been added that allows the user to precisely guide the drone with an electro-optical camera when it approaches the target. It now has the ability to attack not only fixed targets but also moving targets. The flight speed of the improved Lancet reaches 300 km/h, three times that of Shahed-136.

It was Izdeliye-53 that attacked the Ukrainian air force base this time. This drone uses thermobaric bombs and anti-tank high explosive bombs as warheads, and can fly 60 to 80 km to strike Ukraine’s rear base. The air force base that was hit is a temporary airfield on the outskirts of Kryvyrikh, a city in central Ukraine. Ukraine is using former Soviet-era bases across the country to protect its aircraft from Russian air raids. Air power is operated by frequently moving base airfields. MIG-29 fighter jets were recently temporarily deployed at the airfield near Kryvyrikh, which was attacked by a Russian drone. It is a rear area 65km away from the nearest front line in a straight line, and among the Russian military’s strike assets, the only weapon capable of attacking this base was the Shahed-136, a long-range cruise missile launched from a bomber or warship. Since these weapons are launched from Russian territory and fly hundreds of kilometers, Ukraine has ample time to prepare.

Russia exploited this loophole in Ukraine. Russian special forces advanced to the rear, near Kryvyrikh, and were peering into the temporary Ukrainian military airfield using small drones. The Ukrainian military was completely unaware of this fact. Based on reconnaissance information from special forces, the Russian military launched Izdeliye-53 from a launch site believed to be near the Dnieper River in northeastern Kherson. This drone flew quickly over a distance of 65 km and accurately hit a Ukrainian MIG-29 fighter jet. A small Russian military drone hovering above the base was recording the entire process. After the mission was over, the Russian special forces recovered the small drone and leisurely left the operational area.

Small loitering munitions such as lancets and Izdeliye-53 have low flight altitudes and are small in size, making them difficult to detect with regular radar. This is because there is a high possibility that radar reflection waves from clouds and raindrops will be mixed in the case of flocks of birds, ground structures, or rain. Therefore, high-performance models with excellent precision and processing capabilities are used as radars to detect low-altitude and small flying objects. The Ukrainian military does not have many such high-performance radars, so it does not have the capacity to deploy them to front-line military bases or field units. Accordingly, an increasing number of Ukrainian long-range artillery assets and field command posts are being destroyed by small suicide drones.

Tires to prevent drone attacks are placed on a Tu-95 bomber at an air force base near Saratov, Russia. [뉴시스]

These problems are not limited to Ukraine. This is because South Korea is also vulnerable to North Korea’s drone attacks. In 2014, a North Korean small unmanned aerial vehicle crossed the cease-fire line and went south leisurely, then crashed into a hill in Inje-gun, Gangwon-do while returning from filming the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) base in Seongju-gun, Gyeongsangbuk-do. South Korean military authorities were unable to properly detect North Korean drones while they were swirling around our airspace. At that time, the North Korean drone took several photos while circling over the THAAD base as well as the Blue House. Drones were also discovered in Paju, Gyeonggi Province, Baengnyeong Island in Incheon, and Samcheok in Gangwon Province, but the military authorities were completely unaware of them until residents reported them.

At the time, the military authorities said they would improve the low-altitude air defense network and promoted the introduction of the TPS-880K local air defense radar, improvement of the old Biho self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, and introduction of the new Cheonho self-propelled anti-aircraft gun. However, eight years later, the Korean air defense network was breached again. Last December, while North Korea’s small drone was flying leisurely over Seoul and the metropolitan area, military authorities failed to detect it. After discovering that they were safely returning to North Korea, fighter jets and attack helicopters were deployed to intercept them, but all failed. The Korean military’s air defense network has not changed for eight years even after suffering the humiliation of 2014.

Korean military TPS-880K local air defense radar. [방위사업청 제공]

As pointed out earlier, loitering munitions or small drones are difficult to detect with regular anti-aircraft radar. Therefore, high-performance phased array radars specialized for detecting and tracking small targets are essential for drone response operations in developed countries. It is also a four-sided fixed phased array radar, which is a precision radar that can scan 360 degrees in all directions in real time and analyze data. In addition, a command and communication system that links various detection assets owned by each military into a single network to share target information in real time is also installed as standard. However, during the North Korean drone incident in December last year, the South Korean military still exposed serious limitations in drone response operations.

First of all, the Army’s ‘newest’ local air defense radar could not detect enemy drones at all until they entered the skies over Seoul. This is inevitable because the local air defense radar is not a four-sided radar that can simultaneously detect all directions of 360 degrees, but is a fixed one-sided type that continuously illuminates only a specific direction. In the direction of Ganghwa Island, an AH-1S Cobra attack helicopter attempted to intercept an enemy drone that was fortunately caught on radar, but failed to hit a single target even after firing over 100 cannonballs at close range. There was also an absurd situation where Marine Corps troops mistook a friendly aircraft chasing a drone for a drone and entered anti-aircraft alert. Even if a drone is discovered, the troops at each anti-aircraft post or air defense position do not have the authority to respond immediately. Even if a suspicious track is discovered on the front line, a report is sent through the battalion and division to the corps air defense operation control center (AOC), and then the AOC determines whether to identify the enemy and respond. By the time the interception order is delivered to each guard post or position, the enemy drone has already disappeared.

North Korea has recognized this weakness of the South Korean military and has been investing heavily in the drone field for a long time. In particular, Chairman Kim Jong-un received five suicide drones and one reconnaissance drone as gifts during his recent visit to Russia. Among these, five suicide drones were known to be members of the Lancet series that previously attacked the Ukrainian Air Force base. It is highly likely that North Korea will replicate this suicide drone and deploy it in large quantities. This will have disastrous results for the Korean military, which has poor low-altitude air defense capabilities against small drones. This is because, in the event of an emergency, a large number of small drones will launch a wave of attacks on major air force bases in the metropolitan area and Gangwon area, as well as air defense and command and control facilities in various areas along the ceasefire line.

The Korean military must use the cases of Russia and Ukraine as an example to completely overhaul the current air defense operation system. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, which found low-performance, low-cost drones easy, suffered great damage from the Ukrainian military’s joint drone-missile airstrikes. Now, Ukraine has been caught off guard by Russia’s suicide drone. The Korean military must also make every effort to respond to drones, which have emerged as a major variable in future battlefields.

[이 기사는 주간동아 1409호에 실렸습니다]

Shin In-gyun, CEO of Independent Defense Network

Source: Donga

Mark

Mark Jones is a world traveler and journalist for News Rebeat. With a curious mind and a love of adventure, Mark brings a unique perspective to the latest global events and provides in-depth and thought-provoking coverage of the world at large.