Russia, before the war, retained control of the Black Sea as well as the Sea of Azov despite the Ukrainian presence in many of the major ports. After the war-and if a negotiation, now unlikely to cancel it–, none of that will change.
Before the war, the Kremlin ruled the pro-Russian Ukrainian provinces bordering the Donbas Valley. After the war, it would remain the same, dominating those territories.
Before the war, Russia ruled the strategic Crimean Peninsula that it put together in 2014, endowed with a powerful naval base at Sebastopol where it confines its maritime power to the Mediterranean. After the war, that power will continue unchanged.
Ukraine before the war had promised not to join NATO, the Western mutual protection alliance, and to maintain its neutrality even. disposal of any atomic weapon. War cannot change that situation.
Before the war, Russia had a strong economic influence in Eastern Europe thanks to the ambitious investment of the Silk Road by its Chinese ally. After the war, that scheme must remain in place, unchanged.
Before the war, the Ukrainian government froze its bid to join the European Union. After the war, this process would remain pending bureaucratic labyrinths.Before the war, NATO advanced with little equipment, several thousand soldiers and some improvisation in North America, in Eastern Europe. Beginning with the war, that advance would expand with more affiliated countries and a untapped deployment of troops since the Cold War.
Before the war, Russia was one of the countries with the best credit standing in the world. After the war, it would be difficult for him to return to that area of predictability.
Before the war, the Kremlin had so many reserves in its central bank equivalent to more than a third of its $ 1.4 trillion GDP, a commendable rarity for an intermediate economy smaller than Brazil. In war, that level has collapsed without specific prospects to return to the starting point.
Before the war, Russia’s growth was about 5% per year with a big recovery after falling of -2.7% in 2020, amid the pandemic. Dragged by the invasion of Ukraine, the economy will collapse this year 10% or 12.4% according to moderately optimistic official calculations.
Before the war, annual inflation worried the Russian government and establishments with an 8.4% increase in 2021. But because of the war, the cost of living will rise this year by more than 20.7% according to data from own statistical office of the Russian Federation.
Before the war, the Kremlin was on its way to becoming the supplier of 70% of the gas needed for homes and industry in Germany, the largest European power with a spectacular gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, the Nord Stream 2. The war nullified that project that had strengthened Russia’s political power.
During and after the war, on the other hand, the cancellation of most of the oil quotas that Europe receives from Russia would be accelerated by growing alternatives for gas. In the medium term, Europe will no longer be Russia’s energy client, its main export tool.
Before the war, Russia had the privilege of sharing a tripod of geopolitical power in the region with Turkey and Iran. Because of the war, Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus weakened where Turkey, now a central ally of Ukraine and far from Moscow, was certainly advancing. Azerbaijan, a Turkish satellite, has certainly been promoted as one of the alternative channels for move the energy business to the Kremlin.
Before the war, Moscow used undisputed power in its backyard. After the war broke out, the region began to rotate. There is a civil rebellion of unexpected fate in Armenia to replace the obedient pro-Russian government of that country. And the military threats from Iran, also opposed to Russia and reluctant to lose influence over Turkey and NATO.
Before the war, the Kremlin boasted an incredibly modern military practice, supernatural, impossible to ignore. The war, on the other hand, revealed serious weakness and skepticism and a force that was at least not well organized.
This balance may continue, but it reaches the list to observe the limits of Russia’s narrative to justify this war. Unlimited, on the other hand, is the question of what is currently going on for an autocrat who decides to launch his military force into a neighboring country without being harmed. for no other reason but a vivid tsarist nostalgia.
An operation, moreover, with null or relative profit, returning to the starting point, wearing a rag and with the balance of a frightening mountain of tens of thousands dead fading in the order of official discourse.
When the panorama of a conflict of enormous precariousness at its origin and likely to worsen is observed in this way, the possibilities of an in -depth analysis are reduced.
Putin is not Napoleon advancing around the world. It is not history, as Hegel would say. He was a modest Hitler. If before Russia had the tools to regain a true global centrality, this war would be the death rattle of its past glories.
Vladimir Putin’s drama is that he will not get much out of this war, as this list tries to show, except for possibly some parts of the territories that he can get in the modern administration of his influence. In any case, this drama confirms that ancient teaching decay remains the worst trap of absolutism.
Source: Clarin
