“No one can know what the exact intentions are Vladimir Putinbut if I won in Ukraine I would certainly be tempted go beyond in the next few years,” he says in an interview with Clarion, Bruno Tertraisdeputy director of the Parisian “Foundation for Strategic Research” and one of the greats European experts in nuclear deterrence and proliferationas well as in military strategy.
Tertrais previously worked for the French Ministry of Defense and NATO. He has been dedicated to research for two decades. Below is his dialogue with Clarion.
-Some European leaders talk about a Russian military threat against Europe in the coming years. Can we expect an attack like they warn?
-No one can know what Vladimir Putin’s exact intentions are, but if he won in Ukraine he would certainly be tempted to go further in the coming years. In any case, I do not believe that today there is a risk of a Russian military attack against a NATO country. If there is a risk, it is for example against Moldova, which is not a member of NATO or the EU. Part of its territory, Transnitria, is de facto independent and Russia may be tempted to send troops.
Bruno Tertrais, nuclear deterrence expert. Photo courtesy-In the event of a future attack, which countries would be most at risk?
-In the case of a classic military attack, the Baltic countries and Poland would certainly be the ones most in danger. But all Western democracies are vulnerable to an unconventional attack, of a cyber type, for example. And to misinformation.
-The hypothesis of Donald Trump’s return to the White House puts NATO under pressure. If the United States demonstrated to Russia that it would not help an attacked European country, would the Europeans be able to defend themselves from a conventional attack?
-The question is whether we could dissuade Russia from attacking us. If this were not the case, and if all American forces left Europe – an extreme hypothesis – we could only defend ourselves with classical means against a limited attack.
-Putin (and Medvedev) sometimes talked about nuclear weapons. Is the threat credible? Could you use them to win in Ukraine if you were losing?
-What Medvedev says doesn’t matter. The only officials allowed to talk about nuclear weapons are Putin, Lavrov (chancellor), Shoigu (defense minister) and Patrushev (secretary of the Russian Security Council). Their statements are less “threats” than “deterrent reminders.” I don’t find them particularly disturbing. Furthermore, I note that there has been no movement of nuclear weapons, no alerting or any maneuvers out of the ordinary since February 24, 2022 (the start date of the attack on Ukraine).
-But should we be afraid of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons?
-The risk always seems too overrated to me. What the Kremlin has said since February 24, 2022 is in accordance with official Russian nuclear doctrine. And the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, in that doctrine, are very strict.
-Putin can’t think that the use of nuclear weapons could end the war in the conditions Russia would like?
I’m not in his head. And I note that China also told him that it would be very bad for him. But in extreme conditions I might think so. If so, he probably would not concern the Ukrainian theater of operations, because those weapons would require visible and lengthy manipulations. We would have time to react. It could be a missile launched into the Black Sea, without military effect, only as a political signal.
-President Macron has spoken about sending European troops to Ukraine, albeit with non-combat roles. Would he go to war against Russia?
-NO. This would strictly be assistance to Ukraine. Nobody seriously thinks that Western fighting forces will fight against the Russian army. In any case, Moscow estimates that it is already “at war against NATO”.
-Are there already Western troops in Ukraine, such as secret services or experts in some kind of weapons transferred to Kiev?
-Definitely not (combat) troops. Secret Service agents, definitely. Even advisors or trainers of Ukrainian troops.
-Could the French nuclear weapon be the nuclear umbrella of the European Union, even with a larger arsenal financed by the Union itself, even if it is under French control, or could it be shared?
“Europe”, not “European Union”. Above all, the EU must not get involved in matters of nuclear deterrence. Also because the United Kingdom (already outside the EU) should have a role. Furthermore, the financing of the French deterrent force would not be shared: this would not be in anyone’s interest, especially France, which would not want to see its nuclear budget partly dependent on foreign parliaments. And Paris would share the decision to use nuclear weapons no more or less than Washington does today with its allies. In other words: consultation is possible, but there can only be one decision maker. This is how it works in NATO and I don’t imagine it could work differently in a European framework.
-Should the European Union start developing its defense capability outside of NATO?
-Not outside NATO until necessary. What matters today is to increase our combat capabilities at the national level, which would benefit all of Europe in all scenarios.
Source: Clarin
Mary Ortiz is a seasoned journalist with a passion for world events. As a writer for News Rebeat, she brings a fresh perspective to the latest global happenings and provides in-depth coverage that offers a deeper understanding of the world around us.