On Monday morning, as rows of armored vehicles and soldiers parked in Moscow to celebrate Russia’s victory over Germany in World War II in 1945, one element of Russia’s military force was missing: fighter jets its.

And as officers associate their premise with bad weather, Russian aircraft, pilots and ground aircraft performed very low in the war against Ukraine.

The absence is underscored by the president’s failure Vladimir Putin to build a capable modern air force, while Russian aircrews are flying in and out of Ukrainian airspace and descending unguided bombs while fleeing from enemy surface-to-air missiles that Moscow had not yet destroyed, even after 75 days of fighting.

Russian fighter jets usually perform in between 200 and 300 departures per daya senior Defense Department official told reporters at a briefing on Monday, but they failed to establish air superiority in Ukraine, which continues to fly its own fighters and attack planes against Russian troops.

And by the time the war entered its third month, Russia had already spent many of its weapons. More accuratesuch as cruise missiles and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

On May 2, the Pentagon said Russia was firing more than 2125 of those guns since the invasion began.

Their use fell sharply after the second week of the war, British Defense Minister Ben Wallace said in a speech on Monday.

The Russians “detonated” many of their precision-guided munitions, said the senior U.S. official, who was not allowed to speak publicly about the details of Russia’s shortcomings.

“In fact, they continue to hit Mariupol with a lot of silent bombs.”

The so-called dumb, or unguided, air-dropped munitions are pre-9/11 relics for the U.S. and NATO, as the Western military has almost completely replaced its stockpiles with pump guide kit towards their targets with lasers or GPS satellite signals.

The official also said that sanctions and export controls were put in place after Russia invaded Ukraine limited access from Moscow to the types of electronic components it needed to produce guided weapons, which affected Putin’s ability to re -supply your army with modern aerial ammunition.

The lack of Russian weapons guides, and their often poor accuracy when used, offer further indication of how far behind Moscow’s armed forces are compared to Western armies.

Senior U.S. Department of Defense officials spoke The New York Timess in the background to discuss intelligence assessments and their analysis of Russia’s failures in Ukraine said that the evidence seen during the invasion points to a Russian guided weapons program that was in its infancy, in which pilots are not quick to find targets. on the ground, and missiles. launched in Ukraine that often miss their targets, if they work at all.

The Soviet Union was relatively uninterested in developing conventional guided weapons until the mid-1980s, officials said, and engaged in serious research and development only over the past two decades.

Russia has demonstrated some of its new arsenal in airstrikes in Syria since 2015, albeit in limited numbers only during strictly controlled operations and under extremely favorable conditions.

Instead of quickly targeting Ukrainian troops and moving vehicles using satellite or laser-guided bombs, Russia has shown that it can only hit stationary targets such as military buildings or population centers. of civilians, either by firing volleys of projectiles. by unguided artillery or rocket attacks on them, U.S. officials said, or by using large guided ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles that are often missing or inaccurate.

Russia’s fighter jets continue to rely on unmanned start -up bombs, even compared to those built by the United States after World War II.

While the standard US series of Mark-80 bombs used by NATO can be easily configured for a variety of missions and have a forged steel body, the Russian counterpart is weld.

A senior intelligence official said the design favored Russia cheap mass production with precision and requires less assembly before flight, making those bombs a more attractive option for use by Russian forces in comparison. no training.

Guided munitions used by Russia are limited to Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles deployed from Tu-95 Bear and Tu-160 Blackjack bombers flying in Russian and Belarusian airspace;

launched on the ground short- and medium-range ballistic missiles such as the Tochka and Iskander; and a small number of Calibr cruise missiles firing from warships at sea, an official said.

Many of those missiles have only been launched in the last 10 years, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency report.

In comparison, the Pentagon was testing its first widely deployed cruise missile, called the Tomahawk, in the late 1970s.

Russia’s reliance on unguided bombs for its warplanes in Ukrainian airspace has led to confusion to government analysts and civilian weapons since the aggression began on February 24, because only three years ago Russia proved that it has laser -guided weapons and by satellite it used to attack hospitals in Syria.

However, the difference between Russia’s airstrikes in Syria and in Ukraine is enormous, said a senior analyst of the Department of Defense.

In Syria, Russian warplanes can fly unopposed and hover over their targets as long as they want before dropping a guided bomb, something that makes it impossible for Ukrainian planes and surface-to -air missiles.

Defense Department officials also said the problem of targeting Russia was exacerbated by lack of investment Suitable for tracking drones.

Only two unarmed Russian models, the Forpost and the Orlan, were observed, while Ukraine targeted Russian troops and vehicles with TB2 drone-fired missiles purchased from Turkey.

The problem, U.S. officials said, was also expressed as one of scale:

Russia has failed to use some of the guided bombs it has used in parts of Syria to support the demands of a massive ground campaign in a country the size of Ukraine.

In addition, Russian cruise missiles fire at targets in Ukraine on occasion they fail in their goals or even completely failed after launch, U.S. officials said.

They added that Russian war planners were likely to have failed in adequately developing the so -called goal packagesa series of instructions entered into cruise missiles before flight that included instructions on course headings and altitudes that would deliver the weapon to its intended destination, to them.

“Syria has provided an opportunity to test in a real-world operational scenario many of these new systems that the Russians have long developed,” a Defense Department official said in an interview.

“But they were not pressured do something to measureSo when you try to magnify that for something like Ukraine, you really emphasize the system and you can highlight some issues there. “

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