How the CIA tracked down the Al-Qaeda leader

WASHINGTON – Intelligence officials made a crucial discovery this spring after tracking down Ayman al-Zawahri, the leader of al-Qaeda, in Kabul, Afghanistan:

He liked it read by yourself on the balcony of his safe house early in the morning.

Analysts are looking for that kind of insight into life patterns, all habits that the CIA can exploit.

In al-Zawahri’s case, his long visits to the balcony gave the agency the opportunity to launch a clear missile that could avoid collateral damage.

The search for al-Zawahri, one of the most wanted terrorists in the world, dates back to before the 9/11 attacks.

The CIA kept looking for him as he climbed to the top Al Qaeda after the death of Osama bin Laden and after the Taliban took over Afghanistan last year.

And one misstep during the manhunt, the recruitment of a double agent, led to one of the bloodiest days in the agency’s history.

Shortly after the United States left Kabul, the CIA stepped up its efforts to find al-Zawahri, convinced that he would try to return to Afghanistan.

Senior officials had told the White House they could keep and build networks of informants inside the country from afar and that the United States would not be blind in the face of terrorist threats there.

For the agency, finding al-Zawahri would be key proof of that claim.

This article is based on interviews with current and former US officials and others, independent analysts who have studied the decade-long hunt and others knowledgeable about the events leading up to the weekend attack.

Most spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitive intelligence used to find al-Zawahri.

For years it was thought that al-Zawahri was hiding in the border area of Pakistanwhere many Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders took refuge after the US invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001.

He was wanted in connection with the 1998 embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, and the CIA had tracked down a network of people that intelligence officials thought supported him.

Scrutiny of that network escalated with the US departure from Afghanistan last year and the belief among some intelligence officials that al Qaeda’s top leaders were tempted to go back.

The impression turned out to be correct.

The agency found out the family al-Zawahri had returned to a shelter in Kabul.

Although the family tried to make sure they were not monitored and to keep al-Zawahri’s location a secret, intelligence agencies soon learned that Even him He had returned to Afghanistan.

“There was a renewed effort to find out where he was,” said Mick Mulroy, a former CIA agent.

“The only positive thing that could have come from the withdrawal from Afghanistan is that some high-level terrorist figures would have thought it was safe for them to be there.”

The shelter was owned by a collaborator of senior officials in the Haqqani Network, a violent and battle-hardened wing of the Taliban government, and was located in an area controlled by the group.

Top Taliban leaders met at home from time to time, but US officials don’t know how many knew the Haqqani were hiding al-Zawahri.

If some senior Taliban officials did not know that the Haqqani had allowed al-Zawahri to return, his assassination could open a split among the groups, independent analysts and others reported events.

It is not clear why Al-Zawahri returned to Afghanistan.

I had been making promotional and recruiting videos for a long time and it would have been easier to produce them in Kabul.

It may also have had better access to medical treatment.

Regardless of the reason, his ties to Haqqani network leaders have led US intelligence officials to the shelter.

“The Haqqani have a very long relationship with Al Qaeda dating back to the days of the Mujahideen,” said Dan Hoffman, a former CIA officer.

“They provide Al Qaeda with much of the tactical support What do you need”.

Once the shelter was located, the CIA followed the playbook written during the search for bin Laden.

The agency has built a site template and tried to learn everything about him.

Analysts finally they identified to a figure who stood on the balcony reading but never left the house, like al-Zawahri.

US officials quickly decided to attack him, but the location of the house posed problems.

It was located in the Sherpur district of Kabul, an urban area of ​​close-together houses.

A missile armed with a large explosive could damage nearby homes.

And any kind of incursion of the forces of Special operationss would be prohibitively dangerous, limiting the US government’s attack options.

Al-Zawahri’s research was of great importance to the agency.

After the US invasion of Afghanistan, the CIA base in Khost province became the home of a target group dedicated to tracking down both bin Laden and al-Zawahri.

It was one of the leads developed by the CIA to track down al-Zawahri that turned out disastrous for the agency officers at that base, Camp Chapman.

CIA officials hoped that Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, a Jordanian doctor and al-Qaeda propagandist, would lead them to al-Zawahri.

He provided US officials with information about al-Zawahri’s health, convincing them that his intelligence was real.

But it was actually a double agent, and on December 30, 2009, he showed up at Camp Chapman wearing a suicide vest.

when it exploded, seven agents of the CIA is dead.

For many, Khost’s attack intensified efforts to find al-Zawahri.

“To honor your legacy, you continue the mission,” Hoffman said.

In 2012 and 2013, the CIA focused hunting in the North Waziristan region on Pakistan.

CIA analysts were sure they had found the town where he was hiding al-Zawahri.

But intelligence agencies have failed to find his home in the city of a dozen complexes, making a raid or drone strike impossible.

However, American hunting forced al-Zawahri to remain in the tribal areas of Pakistan, perhaps limited effectiveness of his leadership within al-Qaeda.

“Whenever something related to bin Laden or Zawahri hit the intelligence channels, everyone stopped to step in and help out,” said Lisa Maddox, a former CIA analyst.

“It was the CIA’s promise to the public: bring them to justice.”

On April 1, senior intelligence officials briefed national security officials in the White House about the refuge and how they had tracked down al-Zawahri.

After the meeting, the CIA and other intelligence agencies worked to find out more about what they called the life model by al-Zawahri.

A key insight was that he was never seen leaving the house and seemed to get fresh air just standing on an upstairs balcony.

He remained on the balcony for extended periods of time, which gave the CIA a good opportunity to attack him.

Al-Zawahri continued to work at the shelter, producing videos for distribution to the Qaeda network.

A senior administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive decisions that led to the attack, said the information presented to the White House was repeatedly scrutinized.

also by a team of independent analysts in charge of identifying all those staying in the shelter.

As options for an attack developed, intelligence officials analyzed what kind of missile al-Zawahri could be hit by fire without causing significant damage to the shelter or surrounding neighborhood.

Eventually they opted for a missile form hellfire designed to kill to one person.

William Burnsthe director of the CIA and other intelligence officials informed the president Joe Biden on July 1, this time with the safe house model, the senior official said.

At that meeting, Biden asked about the possibility of Collateral damageurging Burns to explain how the agents found al-Zawahri and confirmed his information and their plans to kill him.

Biden has ordered a series of tests.

The White House has asked the National Counterterrorism Center to provide a independent evaluation on the impact of the elimination of al-Zawahri, both in Afghanistan and on the network around the world, a senior intelligence official said.

The president also asked about the possible risks for Mark R. Frerichsan American hostage held by the Haqqani.

In June and July, officials met several times in the Situation Room to discuss information and examine possible ramifications.

The CIA’s plans called for it to use its own drones.

Because he was using his own assets, few government officials Pentagon They were involved in planning the attack, with many senior military officials learning of it shortly before the White House announcement, an official said.

On July 25 Biden, satisfied with the plan, authorized the CIA to carry out the airstrike when the opportunity presented itself.

Sunday morning in Kabul it was time.

A CIA-piloted drone found al-Zawahri on his balcony.

Agency agents fired two missilesending a hunt for over two decades.

Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Adam Goldman and Michael Crowley contributed to this report.

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