The Ukrainian army wants to “strengthen” its positions in Bakhmut, denying the speculation about a withdrawal against Russian troops.

According to a statement by the Ukrainian presidency, made public on Monday, the commanders-in-chief of the Ukrainian forces declared themselves “in favor of the continuation of the defensive operation”. But how far are the Ukrainians willing to go to defend the city? RFI consulted Thibal Fouilletmilitary strategy expert at the Foundation for Strategic Research.

-What is the goal of the Ukrainians in Bakhmut: to resist at all costs or to make an orderly retreat in time to avoid being surrounded?

– It is not possible to know the intentions of their staff, but it is likely that the Ukrainians are preparing a gradual withdrawal, which is what would seem logical and rational. Indeed, a siege would be disastrous not only for the loss of men and materials, but also for what it implies in terms of image and trauma, as we have seen for example in Mariupol. And this logic of “last minute” withdrawal has already been applied twice during the conflict, by both sides. The Russians did the same in Kherson and the Ukrainians did it when they defended the Severodonetsk-Lyssychansk pocket.

– So the goal would be to avoid a collapse by continuing to deplete Russian forces?

That has become the goal. But that wasn’t the initial goal because Bakhmut has no fundamental strategic interests. It became a problem because it was the only area where the Russians could advance and where they were concentrating their efforts. So the Ukrainians responded by trying to exhaust their capabilities for as long as possible, and repeating what happened with the Severodonestk salient.

-If it happens, will the fall of Bakhmut be a key moment in the conflict?

-It won’t be a key moment for two reasons. First, because the characteristic of this conflict is that it is a war of attrition that takes time… And even the most notable successes, such as the recapture of Kherson and the advance on Kharkov, lead at best only to an operational breakthrough and not to the collapse of the opponent.

Second, because Bakhmut’s capture was of limited interest due to topography and geographic constraints. After Bakhmut, the Russians will face other urban areas and go from one point to another. So it will be a political advantage for the Russians, who will use it as a big victory, but operationally it won’t be anything really decisive.

-You say that Bakhmut allows the Ukrainians to exhaust the Russian forces, but the opposite is also true: the Ukrainians themselves exhaust themselves on Bakhmut?

Of course, this applies to both sides and is a characteristic of a war of attrition. But exhaustion is always favorable to the defender and unfavorable to the attacker. From this point of view, the comparison with Verdun is pertinent, because during this battle of the First World War, both the Germans and the French were exhausted in terms of means and men. But, even so, the advantage was for the defender, because he broke the opponent’s offensive momentum. This is what the Ukrainians are looking for in Bakhmut: to exhaust the Russians enough that they can’t go ahead with the next move.

-Since 24 February and the start of the invasion, there has been a swing of the pendulum: a series of Russian advances, and then a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Are we headed for a Bakhmut-like scenario?

-It’s hard to say, but the sure thing is that this idea is present in Ukrainian rhetoric. After the February-March Russian offensive would come a Ukrainian-led (Boreal) spring offensive… And this dialectic was quite favorable to the Ukrainians, as we saw with Kherson and Kharkov. I don’t know if this will translate into operational terms, but in rhetoric it is like this: the Russians on the offensive, and the Ukrainians who are already favoring or planning a counter-offensive for the next few months.

– Is the battle of Bakhmut also a question of power within the Russian side itself, between Wagner’s mercenaries and the conventional army?

-We can see it in the friction in terms of communication, which was very strong, especially during the battles of Soledar and now Bajmut. With Wagner announcing certain advances then denied by the conventional army. And when Wagner announced the advances, it was easy to understand the frustration this caused in the Russian military, as the strong support was, of course, his doing, not Wagner’s. There are also operational frictions, lack of integration and direct cooperation. So obviously there is a political interest and there is a war of political influence within the Russian forces fighting in this area.

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